Comparative Analysis of the Banking Regulatory Framework in Iran: Critique of the Mission-Oriented Model in Light of Inclusive Banking and Risk-Based Supervision

Authors
Reza Yarifard 1
Ava Abbasi 2
1 PhD in Accounting, Faculty Member, Islamic Azad University
2 PhD Candidate in Public Administration, Human Resources Management Track, University of Tehran
10.22034/jik.2026.24245
Abstract
In recent years, the central Bank has adopted a mission-oriented regularity framework approach to govern bank behavior. In this approach, banks, excluding universal banks, face explicit constraints on resource allocation and mobilization, organized within mission-based groups. The logic underpinning this approach assumes that limiting the scope of bank activities can lead to risk reduction and enhanced financial stability. This contrasts with international experience, which shows that the dominant trajectory of banking regulation over recent decades has moved toward risk-based prudential supervision and the universal banking model.  
This research aims to critically analyze the theoretical and practical foundations of mission-oriented regulation in Iran’s banking system, using an analytical-comparative approach. To this end, the legal and regulatory framework governing banking activities in Iran is compared with the banking systems of twelve selected countries, including the European union, The United States, Canada, Japan, and Australia. The analysis focuses on the institutional logic of banking regulations, the scope of freedom of banking activities, and risk control instruments within the framework of prudential supervision.
The research aims to critically analyze the theoretical and practical foundations of mission-oriented regulation in Iran’s banking system, employing an analytical-comparative approach. To this end, the legal and regulatory framework governing banking activities in Iran is compared with the banking systems of twelve selected countries, including Germany, France, Japan, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, European Union, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada,   Singapore, Pakistan and Malaysia. The current analysis focuses on the institutional logic of banking regulations, the scope of freedom of banking activities, and risk control instruments within the framework of prudential supervision.
The research finding indicate that mission-based restrictions, country to their original objective, not only fail to reduce banking risk but also decrease the resilience of the banking system by increasing concentration risk. Limiting portfolio diversification, and weaking competitiveness comparative evidence suggests that in successful banking systems, risk control is achieved through quantitative regulatory tools, capital adequacy models, and continuous risk assessment, rather than through the prohibition or substantive restriction of banking activities.
Keywords
Mission-based Regulation, Risk-Based Supervision, Universal Banking, Concentration Risk, Specialized banks
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